Abstract-Polar lattices, which are constructed from polar codes, are provably good for the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel. In this work, we propose a new polar lattice construction that achieves the secrecy capacity under the strong secrecy criterion over the mod-Λ Gaussian wiretap channel. This construction leads to an AWGN-good lattice and a secrecy-good lattice simultaneously. The design methodology is mainly based on the equivalence in terms of polarization between the Λ/Λ ′ channel in lattice coding and the equivalent channel derived from the chain rule of mutual information in multilevel coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner [1] introduced the wiretap channel and showed that both reliability to transmission errors and a prescribed degree of data confidentiality could be attained by channel coding without any key bits if the channel between the sender and the eavesdropper (wiretap channel C W ) is a degraded version of the channel between the sender and the legitimate receiver (main channel C V ). The goal is to design a coding scheme that makes it possible to communicate both reliably and securely, as the block length of transmitted codeword N tends to infinity. Reliability is measured by the decoding error probability of the legitimate user, namely lim N →∞ Pr{M = M } = 0, where M is the confidential message andM is its estimation. Secrecy is measured by the mutual information between M and the signal received by the eavesdropper Z N . Currently the widely accepted strong secrecy condition was proposed by Csiszár [2] : lim N →∞ I(M ; Z N ) = 0. In simple terms, the secrecy capacity is the maximum achievable rate of any coding scheme that satisfies both the reliability and strong secrecy conditions. Polar codes [3] have shown their great potential of solving this wiretap coding problem. It is proved that polar codes can achieve the strong secrecy capacity when C V and C W are both binary-input memoryless channels (BMS) in [4] , although it cannot guarantee the reliability condition. A subsequently modified scheme [5] fixes this issue and finally satisfies the two conditions. However, for continuous channels such as the Gaussian wiretap channel, the problem of achieving strong secrecy capacity with a practical code is still open.
There has been some theoretical progress in wiretap lattice coding for the Gaussian wiretap channel. The achievable rate for lattice coding achieving weak secrecy over the Gaussian wiretap channel has been derived [6] . Furthermore, the existence of lattice codes approaching the secrecy capacity under the strong secrecy criterion (semantic security) was demonstrated in [7] . Since the analysis of the mod-Λ Gaussian channel provides considerable insight into the construction for the Gaussian wiretap channel, we limit ourselves to the mod-Λ Gaussian wiretap channel. The lattice coset coding scheme for the mod-Λ Gaussian wiretap channel was introduced in [7] . M is encoded into an N -dimensional transmitted codeword X N with an average power constraint P per dimension (we choose a shaping lattice Λ s whose second moment per dimension is P to satisfy this power constraint). The outputs Y N and Z N at Bob and Eve's end are given by [8] , secrecy-good (will be defined in Sect. II) and AWGN-good [9] respectively. Let
Consider a one-to-one mapping: M → [Λ b /Λ e ] which associates each message to a coset leader λ m ∈ Λ b ∩ V(Λ e ) (V(Λ) is the Voronoi region of Λ defined in Sect. II). Alice selects a random lattice point λ ∈ Λ e ∩ V(Λ s ) and transmits X N = λ + λ m . This scheme can achieve both reliability and strong secrecy. Although the existence of secrecy-good lattices has been proved, their explicit construction is still missing.
Polar lattices, which can be considered as the counterpart of polar codes in the Euclidean space, is a promising candidate for the Gaussian wiretap channel. They have already been proved to be AWGN-good [9] , which means the reliability condition can be satisfied and we just need to take the strong secrecy into account. Motivated by [4] , we propose an explicit polar lattice construction which can be proved to achieve both the strong secrecy and reliability over the mod-Λ s channel. Conceptually this new polar lattice can be regarded as an AWGN-good lattice Λ b nested within a secrecy-good lattice Λ e . We note that the mod-Λ front-end simplifies the problem under study in this paper. The coding system with a shaping method to achieve the secrecy capacity of the genuine Gaussian wiretap channel will be addressed in the journal paper.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the background of lattices. The relationship between two wellknown channels in lattice coding and multilevel coding is investigated in Section III. In Section IV we propose our new polar lattice coding scheme and prove its secrecy and reliability. Some remarks are given in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND ON LATTICES

A. Definitions
A lattice is a discrete subgroup of R n which can be described by Λ = {λ = Bx : x ∈ Z n } where the columns of the
For a vector x ∈ R n , the nearest-neighbor quantizer associated with Λ is Q Λ (x) = arg min λ∈Λ λ − x . We define the modulo lattice operation by x mod Λ x − Q Λ (x). The Voronoi region of Λ, defined by V(Λ) = {x : Q Λ (x) = 0}, specifies the nearest-neighbor decoding region. The volume of a fundamental region is equal to that of the Voronoi region V(Λ), which is given by V (Λ) =| det(B) |.
For σ > 0 and c ∈ R n , we define the Gaussian distribution of variance σ 2 centered at c as
We also need the Λ-periodic function
We note that f σ,Λ (n) is a probability density function (PDF) if n is restricted to the the fundamental region R(Λ). This distribution for n ∈ R(Λ) is actually the PDF of the Λ-aliased Gaussian noise, i.e., the Gaussian noise after the mod-Λ operation [10] . In this paper, we propose a new definition of secrecy-good lattices. Note that this definition is different from that in [7] , which is based on the flatness factor.
Definition 1 (Secrecy-good):
A lattice Λ e which results in exponentially vanishing information leakage I(M ; Z N ) is regarded as a secrecy-good lattice.
B. Mod-Λ and Λ/Λ
we call this a binary partition. If an n-dimensional multilevel binary lattice partition chain Λ 1 / · · · /Λ r−1 /Λ r is used, the construction is known as "Construction D" [11, p.232 ] which requires a set of nested linear binary codes. The set of nested linear binary codes C ℓ with block length N and dimension of information bits k ℓ are represented as [N,
A mod-Λ channel is a Gaussian channel with a modulo-Λ operator in the front-end [10] . The capacity of the mod-Λ channel is [10] 
where h(Λ, σ 2 ) is the differential entropy of the Λ-aliased noise over V(Λ):
The differential entropy is maximized to log V (Λ) by the uniform distribution over V(Λ). It is known that the Λ/Λ ′ channel (i.e., the mod-Λ ′ channel whose input is drawn from Λ ∩ V(Λ ′ )) is regular, and the optimum input distribution is uniform [10] . The capacity of the Λ/Λ ′ channel for Gaussian noise of variance σ 2 is given by [10] 
III. EQUIVALENT CHANNELS
For simplicity, we use an one-dimensional binary lattice partition chain Λ 1 /Λ 2 / · · · Λ r to construct lattices Λ b and Λ e . The transmitting signal points
Λ s is for shaping and we assume Λ s ⊂ Λ N r . With some overloading notation, we also write
. This is because the mod-Λ r operation is information-lossless in the sense that I(
So we use the mod-Λ r operator instead of the mod-Λ s operator from now on. We also assume the inputs to the binary encoders C 1 , · · ·, C r−1 are uniformly distributed and independently between each other. Therefore
have equal a priori probabilities where X N i is the output of the ith binary encoder. And we note that all the lattice partitions are regular which implies the Λ i /Λ i+1 is symmetric. The
2 ) with the output defined by Z mod Λ i+1 . The conditional PDF of this channel is f σ,Λi+1 (z − x i ) [10] .
By the chain rule of mutual information,
Transmitting vectors x with binary digits x i , i = 1, · · ·r − 1 over the mod-Λ r channel can be separated into the parallel transmission of individual digits x i over r − 1 equivalent channels, provided that x 1 , ···, x i−1 are known [12] . We investigate these equivalent channels, denoted by W ′ (Z; X i |X 1 , · · ·, X i−1 ), in the framework of lattice codes.
From [10] , the conditional PDF of z is f Z (z|x) = f σ,Λr (z− x), z ∈ V(Λ r ). Then based on the chain rule (2) and equivalent channels [12, (5) ], the conditional PDF of the first equivalent channel with the input x 1 is [10, Lemma 6] 
Also by [10, Lemma 6] , with the uniform inputs, the differential entropy h(Z) = log |Λ 1 /Λ r |+h(Λ 1 , σ 2 ). And the condi-
. Therefore the capacity of the first equivalent channel is
2 )). This result motivates a stronger statement, namely the polar codes constructed from these two channels are the same. To see this, it suffices to show that the mutual information and Bhattacharyya parameters of the resultant bit-channels which are polarized from W (Λ 1 /Λ 2 , σ 2 ) and W ′ (Z; X 1 ) are the same. Let Q(z|x) be a BMS channel with input alphabet X ∈ {0, 1} and output alphabet Z ∈ R. Consider a random vector U 2 that is uniformly distributed over X 2 . Let
be the input to two independent copies of the channel Q and let Z 2 be the corresponding outputs. After the channel combining and splitting, the resultant bit-channels [3] are
. Then we apply this polarization transformation to
2 ) and W ′ (Z; X 1 ), respectively. After some mathematical manipulations, we get
and W
By the definitions of the mutual information and the Bhattacharyya parameter of a BMS channel [3] I(Q)
we have
The validation of the equivalence between the i-th channel
is similar. Since the construction of polar codes are based on either the mutual information or the Bhattacharyya parameters of the bit-channels, polar codes constructed for W (Λ i /Λ i+1 , σ 2 ) and W ′ (Z; X i |X 1 , · · ·, X i−1 ) are the same. We summarize the above analysis in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Consider a lattice L constructed by a binary lattice partition chain Λ 1 / · · · /Λ r . Constructing a polar code for the i-th equivalent binary-input channel W ′ (Z; X i |X 1 , · · ·, X i−1 ) defined by the right hand side of (2) is equivalent to constructing a polar code for the channel W (Λ i /Λ i+1 , σ 2 ).
Remark 1:
One can expect the equivalence in a more general sense than the construction of polar codes. The proof may be based on the equivalence between coset decoding [8] and maximum likelihood (ML) decoding of the fine lattice Λ i in the presence of the Λ i+1 -aliased Gaussian noise.
IV. ACHIEVING STRONG SECRECY AND RELIABILITY
In this section, we demonstrate the polar lattice constructed from a set of nested polar codes can achieve strong secrecy and reliability for the mod-Λ s Gaussian wiretap channel. The construction of component polar codes follows the idea in [4] . We still use the notations in [5] to restate their construction. Define the sets of very reliable and very unreliable indices for a channel Q and 0 < β < 0.5:
The following are immediate results of [13] and [14, Lemma 4.7] :
and since W is degraded with respect to V ,
The indices in G(V ) and N (W ) are the reliable and the secure indices. The index set can be partitioned into the following four sets:
Unlike the standard polar coding, the bit-channels are partitioned into three parts: A set M that carries the confidential message bits, a set R that carries random bits, and a set F of frozen bits which are known to both Bob and Eve prior to transmission. It is shown that lim N →∞ I(M ; Z N ) = 0 if we assign the bits as follows:
A. Gaussian Wiretap Coding Scheme
Now we are ready to introduce the new polar lattice for the mod-Λ s Gaussian wiretap channel shown in Fig. 1 . A polar lattice L is constructed by a set of nested polar codes
) and a binary lattice partition chain Λ 1 /Λ 2 /···/Λ r . Alice splits the message 
) and W i is degraded with respect to V i for 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1. Then we can get A i , B i , C i and D i for 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1. Similarly, we assign the bits as follows
for 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1. Since W i (and V i ) is degraded with respect to W i+1 (and V i+1 ), it is easy to obtain that C i ⊇ C i+1 which means
This construction is clearly a lattice construction as polar codes constructed on each level are nested. A similar proof can be found in [9] . Interestingly, this polar lattice construction generates an AWGN-good lattice Λ b and a secrecy-good lattice Λ e simultaneously. Λ b is constructed from a set of nested polar codes
while Λ e is constructed from a set of nested polar codes
More details about the AWGN-goodness of Λ b are given in Sect. IV-C. Our coding scheme is equivalent to the coset coding scheme we introduced in Sect. I, which maps the confidential message M to the coset leaders λ m ∈ Λ b /Λ e .
B. Strong Secrecy and Secrecy Rate
By using the above assignments and [4, Proposition 16], we have
In other words, the employed polar code for the channel W (Λ i /Λ i+1 , σ 2 e ) can guarantee that the mutual information between the input message and the output is upper bounded by N 2 −N β . From Lemma 1, this polar code can also guarantee the same upper bound on the mutual information between the input message and the output of the channel W ′ (Z; X i |X 1 , · · ·, X i−1 ) as shown in the following inequality:
Recall Z N is the signal received by Eve after mod-Λ r . From the chain rule of mutual information,
where the first inequality is because by adding more random variables cannot decrease the mutual information. Therefore strong secrecy is achieved as lim N →∞ I(M ; Z N ) = 0. Now we present the main theorem of the paper.
Theorem 1: Consider a polar lattice L constructed according to (6) with the binary lattice partition chain Λ 1 / · · · /Λ r and r − 1 binary nested polar codes with block length N . By scaling Λ 1 and r to satisfy the following conditions: Proof: By (4) and (6), is an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the mod-Λ s Gaussian wiretap channel since it equals to the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel as the signal power goes to infinity. Latice codes can not be better than this. It is noteworthy that we successfully remove the 1 2 -nat gap in the achievable secrecy rate derived in [7] which is caused by the limitation of the L ∞ distance associated with the flatness factor.
Remark 4:
The two conditions (i) and (ii) are the design criteria of secrecy-good lattices. The construction for secrecygood lattices requires more levels than the construction of AWGN-good lattices.
C. Reliability
According to the assignment strategy (5), D is assigned with random bits, which results in the fact that the original scheme [4] failed to accomplish the theoretical reliability. More explicitly, for any i-th level channel W (Λ i /Λ i+1 , σ 2 b ) at Bob's end, the probability of error is upper bounded by the sum of the Bhattacharyya parameters of those bit-channels that are not frozen. For each bit-channel index j and β < 0.5, we have
By the definition (3), we can see that the sum of
β . Therefore, the error probability of the i-th level channel under the successive cancellation (SC) decoding, denoted by P
Since multistage decoding is utilized, by the union bound, the final decoding error probability for Bob is bounded as
Pr{M = M } cannot be proved to be vanishing since the bound of the sum j∈D Z(W (j)
is not known. This reliability problem was recently solved in [5] , where a new scheme dividing the information message into several blocks is proposed. For a specific block, D is still assigned with random bits and transmitted in advance in the set A of the previous block. In this case, if the reliability of each partition channel can be achieved, i.e., for any i-th level partition Λ i /Λ i+1 , P SC e (Λ i /Λ i+1 , σ 2 b ) vanishes as N goes to infinity. Then the total decoding error probability for Bob can be made arbitrarily small. Actually, based on the new scheme of assigning the problematic bits in D [5], the i-th level's error probability can be upper bounded by
where k i is the number of information blocks on the i-th level, N ′ is the length of each block which satisfies N ′ ×k i = N and ǫ i N is caused by the first separate block consisting of the initial bits in D i . Since |D i | is very small comparing to the block length N , the error probability ǫ i N can be made arbitrarily small when N is sufficiently large. Therefore, Λ b is an AWGNgood lattice. Note that the rate loss incurred by repeatedly transmitted bits in D i is negligible because |D i | is very small and only one block is wasted on each level. The secrecy rate can still be achieved by choosing sufficiently large k i .
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, we showed that the new polar lattice can achieve both strong secrecy and reliability over the mod-Λ s Gaussian wiretap channel. Since polar lattices are as explicit as polar codes, both their encoding and decoding enjoy the low complexity. The uniform assumption was used to construct AWGN-good lattice Λ b and the secrecy-good lattice Λ e . Since the confidential message is mapped to the coset leaders of Λ b /Λ e , the channel between the confidential message and the Eavesdropper can be seen as a Λ b /Λ e channel. Since the Λ b /Λ e channel is symmetric, the maximum mutual information is achieved by the uniform input. Consequently, the mutual information corresponding to other input distributions can also be upper bounded by rN 2 −N β in (7). Therefore, strong secrecy under other distributions can also be proved, which means our scheme actually achieves semantical security in cryptographic terms [7] , [15] . The rigorous proof will be given in the journal paper. A similar statement for the binary symmetric channel can be found in [15, Theorem 4.12] .
